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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a renewed emphasis on, and interest in, 
bankruptcy law has emerged as an increasing number of companies 
have sought to utilize the bankruptcy system as a means for resolving 
various problems that have brought them to the brink of financial 
ruin.1  Through the efforts of legislators, judges, and practitioners, 
 
 ∗ Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Ill.; J.D., Northwestern University School of 
Law; M.B.A., University of Chicago; B.S./B.A., State University of New York at 
Buffalo.  The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of Kirkland & Ellis or its clients.  I would like to thank David 
Skeel for his comments on a prior draft of this article. 
 1 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 4-5 (2001) (“Law students now flock to bankruptcy classes, the nation’s elite 
law firms have rediscovered bankruptcy practice, and the number and range of 
personal and business bankruptcies have reached unprecedented levels.”); id. at 222 
(“The newfound prominence of corporate bankruptcy practice has also been 
reflected in the academic literature.”); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the 
Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 155, 155 (1989) (“The developing academic interest in legal theory has spurred 
a corresponding interest in expanding the theoretical foundations of bankruptcy law 
as well.”); Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors’ Rights Bargain 
Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 690, 690 (1986) (“It is a commonplace, but nonetheless 
true: the study of bankruptcy has attained a new respectability in American law 
schools.”); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 775 (1987) 
(“As bankruptcy has flourished in the popular press and in law practice, it enjoys 
what may be looked back on as a golden age in academe.”). 
The numerous recent articles published in the field demonstrate the significant 
academic interest in bankruptcy law.  See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Theory of Corporate 
Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (1997); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories 
of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, 
Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998); Douglas G. Baird & Robert 
K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, 
The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Edith H. Jones, Rough 
Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1695 (1998); Donald Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of 
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, 
Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. 
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the bankruptcy system has evolved to accommodate these new and 
varied needs.  This evolutionary process has not occurred overnight.  
Indeed, the bankruptcy system in the United States has continued to 
evolve throughout our nation’s history. 
David Skeel’s recent book, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy 
Law in America provides a valuable perspective on the historical 
evolution of bankruptcy law in the United States.2  Professor Skeel 
catalogues the history of the bankruptcy system in the United States 
from its inception, including the early struggles to define the nature 
of the system as well as major turning points such as the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act and the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.  Debt’s Dominion, 
however, is not merely a historical review; it identifies and analyzes 
the forces that Professor Skeel believes have been responsible for 
shaping U.S. bankruptcy law over the last two hundred years. 
While Professor Skeel emphasizes the efforts of legislators in 
shaping our modern bankruptcy system, arguably the efforts of the 
judiciary have been equally significant.  In particular, the frameworks 
established under the various bankruptcy laws have provided a large 
degree of latitude for judges to develop creative means for resolving 
new and challenging problems that have arisen over the years.  As our 
nation has progressed from a largely agrarian society to an industrial 
power, and now into the information age, our bankruptcy system has 
been forced to evolve along with our nation’s economy.  Indeed, the 
flexibility afforded bankruptcy judges is so great that certain 
commentators have expressed concern that “bankruptcy 
decisionmaking may be without rational constraint.”3 
 
REV. 597 (1993); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: 
Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995); Eric A. Posner, The Political 
Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1997); Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 
(1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 
(1992); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the 
Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 685 (1998). 
 2 Debt’s Dominion is not the first major work providing an overview of bankruptcy 
law in the United States.  Professor Skeel cites a number of influential works, 
including the following: BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING 
BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED 
STATES (1998); PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, 
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (1974); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE 
AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997); THOMAS H. JACKSON, 
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY (1986); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR 
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989). 
 3 Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 333, 334 (1992).  Professor Skeel suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
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In his book, Professor Skeel discusses a number of instances in 
which the courts have developed new procedural mechanisms to 
address problems relating to debtor insolvency, thereby directly 
impacting the nature of the bankruptcy system.  Such innovations 
have been necessary to accommodate an ever-changing commercial 
landscape.  In addressing situations that have arisen for the first time, 
the courts have been forced both to create new rules, and to develop 
more detailed standards within the contours of established rules. 
Moreover, it is apparent from reading Debt’s Dominion that the 
courts have had a more indirect effect in shaping the bankruptcy 
system as well.  While not the focus of his study, Professor Skeel’s 
book demonstrates that legislative changes in the bankruptcy laws 
often have been preceded by judicial innovations designed to resolve 
problems not explicitly addressed by the legislative branch.  Indeed, 
it may be fair to characterize many of the major changes in the 
bankruptcy laws as mere “codifications,” or at least adaptations of 
well-established bankruptcy practice.  As a result, the judiciary itself 
has acted as perhaps one of the most powerful interest groups 
involved in shaping legislation in that it has paved the way in 
developing new mechanisms for addressing problems within the 
bankruptcy system. 
By addressing changing circumstances as they arise, the courts 
have shaped the terms of the debate before the legislature.  As 
Professor Skeel’s book demonstrates, from the determination of 
whether issues relating to insolvency are within the scope of 
congressional bankruptcy powers, to the use of those powers in large-
scale corporate reorganizations, to the development of procedural 
mechanisms necessary to address liability resulting from mass torts, 
the courts consistently have played a leading role in framing the 
terms of the legislative debate. 
This review first provides an overview of the themes expressed in 
Debt’s Dominion, including Professor Skeel’s thesis that the bankruptcy 
laws have been shaped by three primary forces: creditors, pro-debtor 
and other populist interests, and bankruptcy professionals.  It then 
provides certain additional observations concerning the history that 
Professor Skeel outlines.  In particular, Professor Skeel catalogues a 
 
approach to interpreting the Bankruptcy Code in many of its more recent decisions 
may be at odds  with such judicial flexibility and could in some cases stifle further 
judicial innovation.  See Letter from David Skeel to Douglas Smith, Partner, Kirkland 
& Ellis (May 13, 2002) (on file with author).  Faithful adherence to the 
understanding of the text, however, does not necessarily constitute a restraint on 
judicial latitude.  A strict construction of the text may reveal a legislative intent to 
confer broad authority upon the courts. 
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number of instances in which alterations in the bankruptcy system 
have been the direct result of judicial innovation, rather than 
legislative change.  Moreover, it appears that in addition to the 
factors Professor Skeel emphasizes, in fashioning creative solutions to 
bankruptcy problems the courts have had a significant influence on 
the legislature’s enactment of various bankruptcy reforms. 
I.  PROFESSOR SKEEL’S THESIS 
Professor Skeel divides the history of bankruptcy law in the 
United States into “three general eras.”  The first he describes as 
“culminat[ing] in the enactment of the 1898 [Bankruptcy] Act, and 
the perfection of the equity receivership technique for large-scale 
reorganizations.”  Before Congress passed the 1898 Act, there were 
numerous laws that Congress enacted in response to economic 
downturns, which were then repealed when the economy recovered.  
As Professor Skeel observes: “All told . . . Congress passed three 
federal bankruptcy laws prior to 1898: the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 
1841, and 1867.  Together, the acts lasted a total of sixteen years.” 4  
As a result of competing forces, during this period there was an 
“inability to reach a stable outcome on federal bankruptcy 
legislation.” 5 
All of this changed, however, toward the end of the nineteenth 
century with the passage of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, which “set up 
an adversarial, judicial process as the American model for 
bankruptcy” that was more “sympathetic to debtors’ interests.” 6  
Accompanying this newly-created adversarial process, according to 
Skeel, was a rise in the importance and influence of the bankruptcy 
 
 4 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 25; see also Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to 
Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool 
Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 854-55 (1997) (“Congress enacted federal bankruptcy 
laws in 1800, 1841 and 1867.  Each of these early Acts was enacted amid political 
controversy among organized interests and in reaction to national economic crises.  
Each was short-lived—repealed within a brief time after enactment.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing of American Capitalism, 
55 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 291 (1994) (“Before finally implementing a permanent 
regimen of bankruptcy relief in 1898, Congress generated three abortive systems 
from a debate as heated and philosophically far-reaching as those addressing 
monetary policy, the tariff, or the two Banks of the United States, in the process 
tracing with unequaled precision the nation’s basic political faultlines.”). 
 5 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 30. 
 6 Id. at 43; see also Douglass G. Boshkoff, Fresh Start, False Start, or Head Start?, 70 
IND. L.J. 549, 550 (1995) (observing that “[t]he Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the 
product of a prolonged legislative struggle between agrarian interests which wanted 
only voluntary (debtor-initiated) proceedings and banking interests which fought for 
a creditor-controlled involuntary system”). 
 2002 SHAPING AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 113 
bar.  Indeed, Skeel concludes that “[s]ince 1898, bankruptcy 
professionals have been the single most important influence on the 
development of bankruptcy law.” 7 
It was also during this time that the courts began to develop the 
law governing corporate reorganization.  After reviewing the history 
concerning these early judicially-sanctioned reorganizations, 
Professor Skeel concludes that “[i]n a very real sense, the history of 
corporate reorganization is the history of nineteenth-century railroad 
failure.  The periodic collapse of the railroads led to the first 
reorganizations — which were called equity receiverships.” 8  Initially 
there was some question as to whether corporations could take 
advantage of the bankruptcy laws at all — not to mention whether 
they could do so to reorganize, rather than liquidate, their assets.9  
When, however, large railroads began to fail during the nineteenth 
century, the courts devised novel solutions such as the equity 
receivership to allow large-scale corporate reorganizations that were 
not expressly provided for under existing bankruptcy law.10  Such 
innovations were necessary given that it made no sense to liquidate a 
railroad and the massive infrastructure necessary for such operations: 
it was eminently more reasonable to maintain such a company as a 
going concern.  As a result of the need to respond to such novel 
circumstances, significant innovation in the nation’s bankruptcy laws 
marked the end of this first era. 
The second era Skeel discusses encompasses the Great 
Depression and the New Deal.  According to Skeel, the rise of 
populism that accompanied the Great Depression led to the 
enactment of bankruptcy laws that were far less friendly to large 
corporate interests.11  Accordingly, the SEC was afforded a much 
larger role in regulating corporate reorganization, “injecting 
pervasive governmental oversight into a practice that previously had 
consisted largely of private arrangements.”12  Thus, to some extent 
 
 7 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 47; see also Adler, Financial and Political Theories of 
American Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 343 (“Members of the bankruptcy and 
corporate bars are direct beneficiaries of the current bankruptcy regime and the 
commercial and corporate laws supporting it.”). 
 8 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 48. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id. at 98-99. 
 12 Id. at 119; see also id. at 131 (“In corporate bankruptcy the New Deal injected 
sweeping governmental controls into a regime that had previously relied on contract 
and private negotiations . . . .”); cf. Posner, supra note 1, at 60 (“[A]s Mark Roe shows, 
the ideology of populism — characterized by a suspicion of concentrated economic 
and political power — accounts at least partly for the laws that fragment ownership 
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this second era was marked by attempts to impose a more rigid and 
inflexible framework on the bankruptcy process—at least with respect 
to corporate reorganization. 
However, all of this soon changed.  The third and final era 
delineated by Skeel, which included the enactment of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code, involved “a repudiation of the New Deal vision for 
reorganizing large corporations.”13  While a dramatic increase in the 
number of personal bankruptcies14 precipitated the hearings 
preceding the enactment of the Code, the result of the new 
legislation was a dramatic change in the law governing corporate 
reorganization.15  As a result, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, there 
was a “resurgence of large-scale corporate reorganizations.”16  In 
particular, Chapter 11 of the Code “has proven far more attractive to 
troubled firms than prior law because it permits a debtor’s current 
managers to continue running the firm in bankruptcy.” 17  For this 
reason, Skeel concludes that the Code involved a “repudiation” of the 
heavy government oversight inherent in the New Deal legislation.18 
Nonetheless, while the 1978 Code seems to have wrought the 
changes in corporate bankruptcy that Congress intended,19 it has not 
stemmed the flow of consumer bankruptcies that prompted 
consideration of such legislation.  Since the enactment of the 1978 
Code there has been an even greater increase in the rate of consumer 
bankruptcy filings.20  This dramatic increase has resulted in repeated 
calls for reform, and the recent history of the bankruptcy debate has 
 
of public corporations.  If populism has influenced corporate law, it seems likely that 
it also has influenced bankruptcy law.”) (footnote omitted). 
 13 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 5. 
 14 See id. at 136. 
 15 See id. at 161 (“Although the passage of Chapter 11 was by far the most 
important corporate law reform, several other changes also have contributed to the 
flourishing of corporate reorganization since 1978.”). 
 16 Id. at 20. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 19. 
 19 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 336, 372 (1993) (observing that “[t]he new Code — Chapter 11 in particular — 
was designed with an avowed intention to make bankruptcy more attractive to 
businesses in trouble”). 
 20 See, e.g., Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and 
Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 615 (2001) (“[I]n the year 2000, with the 
economy in its eighth year of recovery, personal bankruptcy filings are above one 
million and have been at that level for the last few years, notwithstanding the 
booming economy.”); David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer 
Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311 (1999) (discussing 
reasons for the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings). 
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been marked by a “fierce struggle over the future of consumer 
bankruptcy in the United States.” 21  While creditors have vigorously 
advocated a tightening of the bankruptcy laws, “bankruptcy 
professionals, consumer advocates, and academics . . . have formed a 
tight, ongoing defense” against such efforts.22  To date, these forces 
seem to have won the day: congressional efforts to reform the 
bankruptcy laws to stem the abuse of consumer bankruptcy have 
failed.23  Nonetheless, as Professor Skeel observes, such efforts 
continue, given the proponents’ view that it is critical that some 
measure of rationality be imposed upon consumer bankruptcies in 
the United States.24 
Throughout his discussion of the history of our nation’s 
bankruptcy system, Skeel identifies three primary forces as being 
responsible for the evolution of bankruptcy law in the United States: 
creditor groups, pro-debtor and other populist interests, and 
bankruptcy professionals.25  For example, he observes that “populist 
ideology featured prominently in the nineteenth-century bankruptcy 
debates.” 26  Similarly, he notes that “[i]n their role as bankruptcy 
 
 21 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 187 (“Creditors point to the unprecedented number of 
bankruptcy filings and call for restrictions, while the bankruptcy bar points its finger 
at creditors as the source of the problem.”). 
 22 Id. at 195. 
 23 See id. at 187-89. 
 24 See id. at 210-11. 
 25 Id. at 16.  Skeel further comments that: 
[p]artisan politics have also figured prominently in bankruptcy history.  
Much of creditors’ influence has been in the Republican Party, whereas 
most pro-debtor lawmakers have been Democrats.  The political divide 
was especially pronounced in the nineteenth century, but the 
interaction of the three principal forces in U.S. bankruptcy law and the 
two political parties continues to be an important theme, even today. 
Id.  Similarly, concerns about federalism have also animated the debates over this 
nation’s bankruptcy laws.  Although the Constitution provides an express 
congressional power to enact “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,” id. at 23,  
an ever present debate concerning the proper role of the states in the bankruptcy 
system continues today.  Finally, geographical differences also played a role in 
shaping parties’ views regarding federal bankruptcy laws.  As Skeel observes, during 
the early years of the nation: 
Because southerners feared that northern creditors would use 
bankruptcy law as a collection device to displace southern farmers from 
their homesteads, the strongest opposition to federal bankruptcy came 
from the South.  Many western lawmakers opposed bankruptcy 
legislation for similar reasons.  Lawmakers from the commercial 
northeastern states, by contrast, were much more likely to view federal 
bankruptcy legislation as essential to the promotion of commercial 
enterprise. 
Id. at 26. 
 26 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 81. 
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experts . . . bankruptcy lawyers have an ongoing opportunity to 
influence the legislative process.  In hearing after hearing, one sees 
bankruptcy professionals testifying before the Judiciary Committee 
on bankruptcy-related issues.” 27  Skeel traces the role of these three 
forces in shaping the major changes in the legal framework 
established by Congress as a basis for the bankruptcy system, and 
argues persuasively for their significant impact on bankruptcy law 
throughout our nation’s history.28 
II.  THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
There are, however, additional significant factors that have 
shaped American bankruptcy law, which jump out at the reader.  
Throughout the history of American bankruptcy law, as catalogued by 
Skeel, the role of the courts in crafting novel solutions to problems 
that have arisen in the context of bankruptcy is readily apparent.  
Skeel discusses numerous instances in which the courts have come up 
with innovative solutions that later served as a framework, if not a 
model, for legislative changes in the bankruptcy system.  As a result, 
besides directly creating rules within the flexible framework 
established by Congress, the bankruptcy courts themselves have 
represented an important influence in shaping bankruptcy 
legislation.29 
A.  A History of Innovation 
One of the examples that Professor Skeel discusses at length in 
his book is the utilization of equity receiverships during the 
nineteenth century as a prototypical means of achieving corporate 
reorganizations.30  While the bankruptcy laws did not expressly 
provide a mechanism for large-scale corporate reorganizations,31 
 
 27 Id. at 87; see also id. at 88 (“Given their participation in every phase of the 
legislative process, bankruptcy professionals have an enormous influence on the 
shape of any proposed legislation.”).  Skeel concludes that “[b]ankruptcy lawyers 
have repeatedly lobbied to expand the bankruptcy process, and they have opposed 
amendments that might diminish the use of bankruptcy.”  Id. at 93. 
 28 See id. at 80-100. 
 29 In earlier writings, Professor Skeel has included bankruptcy judges among the 
“bankruptcy professionals” he cites as one of the three forces shaping bankruptcy 
legislation.  See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American 
Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 510 (1998). 
 30 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 1, at 4, 48, 52, 56-69. 
 31 Explaining the lack of a provision for corporate reorganization under the 
bankruptcy laws, Professor Skeel observes that “[i]n the early and middle decades of 
the nineteenth century, there was heated debate whether the Bankruptcy Clause 
gave Congress the power to regulate troubled corporations, rather than just 
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courts came up with novel mechanisms to accomplish this task when 
faced with the large-scale railroad bankruptcies in the late 1800s: 
With a pervasive legislative response unlikely, and no adequate 
common-law precedents, reorganizers and courts cobbled 
together a new device from two powers that did have an 
established common-law pedigree: courts’ equitable authority to 
appoint receivers to preserve the value of a debtor’s property; and 
the right of a mortgage holder to foreclose on mortgaged 
property if the debtor defaults.32 
Thus, the courts developed new procedural mechanisms to address a 
novel problem that they had not faced before—the bankruptcy of a 
company that it made no sense to liquidate.  In doing so, the courts 
themselves significantly, and directly, altered the face of the 
bankruptcy system. 
 Moreover, as Skeel acknowledges, these judicial innovations had 
a significant impact on subsequent bankruptcy legislation:  “When 
Congress finally added a meaningful corporate reorganization option 
to the Bankruptcy Act in the 1930s, it took all of its cues from the 
railroad receivership techniques that had long been used in the 
courts.” 33  Thus, these judicial innovations had an indirect effect in 
spurring Congress to attempt to codify a mechanism for addressing 
corporate reorganization.  In doing so, Congress was largely following 
the lead of the courts. 
A second example involves the procedures developed by the 
courts during the latter half of the twentieth century for addressing 
the mass tort bankruptcies filed by debtors such as Johns-Manville, 
A.H. Robins and Dow Corning, which involved “thousands of actual 
and potential tort victims.”34  Skeel attributes the rise in such filings to 
the “expanded definition of claim” under the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code.35  Nonetheless, in addressing these cases, courts developed 
 
individuals. . . .  In the early decades of the nineteenth century, when corporations 
were closely tied to their domicile states, the argument was quite powerful.”  SKEEL, 
supra note 1, at 52-54. 
 32 Id. at 57. 
 33 Id. at 48; see also Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 131 (1991) (observing that “the equity 
receivership . . . was the forerunner of the business reorganization proceeding in 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
 34 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 217. 
 35 Id.; see also 1 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 315 
(Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT] (“Parties have found that traditional 
individual tort or contract litigation for mass tort or mass contract is unwieldly and 
too expensive for all parties, and has forced them to seek more efficient alternatives.  
The bankruptcy system offers a structured system to manage multiple liabilities and 
has provided a forum for companies with massive liabilities to attempt to do so.”). 
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procedures, which were not expressly codified in existing bankruptcy 
laws, to resolve problems found in this new breed of bankruptcy case.  
In the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, for example, a post-confirmation 
trust was established to pay for asbestos-related tort claims.36  The 
court issued an injunction channeling all tort claims to the trust and 
away from the reorganized debtor.37  In this manner, the court 
established a mechanism for addressing both present and future 
claims.38 
Although such procedures have now become commonplace, 
they have not remained static.  Courts facing asbestos and other mass 
tort claims within the bankruptcy system have developed innovative 
solutions to address such claims within the framework of a debtor’s 
reorganization.39  As a result, Professor Skeel concludes that 
bankruptcy is now “the forum of choice for resolving the modern 
dilemma of mass tort liability.”40  Other commentators agree, noting 
that this is “[o]ne of the most cost-effective uses of bankruptcy . . . .”41 
These procedures have in turn significantly influenced the 
legislature.  As Professor Skeel observes, after the successful 
 
 36 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 217. 
 37 Sheldon S. Toll, Bankruptcy and Mass Torts:  The Commission’s Proposal, 5 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363, 375-76 (1997). 
 38 See id. (“The channeling device, first used in Manville, diverts future claimants 
from the reorganized debtor to a trust or a pool of assets from which they will receive 
compensation.  Channeling injunctions have also been used to protect insurers of 
the debtor and other third parties.  As a result, channeling injunctions are critical to 
any scheme to resolve mass future claims.”) (footnotes omitted); cf. NBRC REPORT, 
supra note 35, at 346 (“Channeling injunctions serve an appropriate and beneficial 
role in the equitable treatment of mass future claimants.  The channeling injunction 
reinforces the effect of the discharge while it clearly directs claimants toward a 
specific fund.”); Warren, supra note 19, at 359 (observing that  bankruptcy law “may 
resolve both present and future claims at once, giving comparable outcomes to those 
with similar legal rights, but different timetables for reaching the courthouse”). 
 39 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 218-21. 
 40 Id. at 221. 
 41 Warren, supra note 19, at 348 n.28 (“One of the most cost-effective uses of 
bankruptcy may be to bring a number of similar lawsuits against a debtor — such as 
those from the tort claimants in A.H. Robins or Johns-Manville — into a single forum 
for much less costly resolution than the case-by-case adjudication that would have 
taken place at state law.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the 
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1355 (1995) (concluding in 
comparing class actions and bankruptcy that “[i]n terms of both its fairness to 
creditors and its ability to rehabilitate a financially strained debtor, the latter wins on 
all counts–except its ability to preserve management in control”); Mark J. Roe, 
Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 855 (1984); Alex Raskolnikov, Note, 
Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 
YALE L. J. 2545, 2547 (1998) (“[M]any have argued that bankruptcy is a better 
remedy for mass torts than class actions like Ahearn and Georgine.”). 
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reorganization of Johns-Manville, “[i]n 1994, bankruptcy 
professionals and the managers of Manville itself persuaded Congress 
to give its explicit imprimatur on the Manville solution to the 
question of how to bind future claimants.” 42  Once again, much as it 
had in the case of the equity receiverships and early corporate 
reorganizations, Congress sought to codify procedures that had long 
been employed by the courts and had become well-established.43 
B.  The Continuing Need for Innovative Solutions 
The development of innovative procedural techniques for 
resolving novel problems arising in bankruptcy continues to this 
day.44  Indeed, given the fierce political forces that have blocked 
recent proposed bankruptcy reforms, the role of the courts in 
crafting solutions to problems arising in bankruptcy may become 
even more important.  In particular, the wide latitude afforded the 
courts in fashioning creative solutions can be used to remedy certain 
 
 42 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 220; see also Toll, supra note 37, at 364 (“As part of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress enacted legislation, codified in section 
524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, to deal with asbestos mass tort claims in Chapter 11 
reorganizations.”) (footnote omitted). 
 43 In its 1997 report, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed 
further codification of the procedures that had been developed by courts for 
addressing mass tort claims.  See NBRC REPORT, supra note 35, at 315-50; SKEEL, supra 
note 1, at 220 (“In keeping with its general enthusiasm for existing practice, the 1997 
Bankruptcy Commission report proposed to expand the reach of bankruptcy still 
further, by applying a similar approach to all firms, including those outside the 
asbestos industry.”); Jones, supra note 1, at 1695 (noting that the NBRC report 
“proposes codifying authority in bankruptcy courts to reorganize or liquidate 
companies exposed to mass future claims”); Toll, supra note 37, at 364. 
 44 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 3, at 364 (“[T]he rule of equity has an essential 
role in bankruptcy decisionmaking.  It allows a court to respond to an inescapable 
clash between strongly held values by mediating their relationship in the context of a 
particular bankruptcy case.  This kind of flexibility creates a possibility that a 
normative constraint definitively ranking the aims would have foreclosed: the court 
may develop a creative solution that accommodates a range of divergent demands.”); 
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing 
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 968 (1991) 
(“[W]hether by default or caprice, the institution of bankruptcy has become a 
medium for relieving the pressure which inevitably builds in a commercial economy 
for solutions to new and unprecedented societal problems. . . .  While it is always 
open to argument whether bankruptcy is the best or most efficient forum in which to 
respond to any particular problem, its role as a problem-solver in the broad sense has 
been unequivocally established.”); cf. Scott, supra note 1, at 691 (“[T]here has been 
increasing resort to the bankruptcy process to resolve vexing conflicts between the 
societal interest in reducing the costs of business failure and the allegedly overriding 
interests in preserving collective bargaining agreements, compensating victims of 
defective products, and insuring the removal of toxic waste and other environmental 
hazards.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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perceived defects in the current system that are in need of immediate 
redress. 
1.  Consumer Bankruptcy 
For example, a number of commentators (including Professor 
Skeel) have cited the dramatic increase in the number of consumer 
bankruptcy filings in recent years,45 many of which seem designed to 
unfairly take advantage of the system at the expense of creditors.  
“[S]ince 1978 bankruptcy rates have skyrocketed to over one million 
per year.”46  As a result, “[m]any commentators worry about the rapid 
growth of consumer bankruptcies.” 47 
The reason that such increases have been possible is apparent.  
As Professor Skeel observes, “U.S. bankruptcy law is far more 
sympathetic to debtors than are the laws of other nations.” 48  This 
sympathy, however, has arguably led to abuse, as debtors who are able 
to pay their debts take advantage of the system to wipe the slate 
clean–particularly as the social stigma associated with bankruptcy has 
declined.49 
By utilizing powers that they already possess, however, 
bankruptcy courts may impose barriers to such abuse.  The courts 
could develop rules in applying their equitable powers to ensure that 
“undeserving” consumer debtors cannot receive an inequitable 
discharge of their debts.50  The rules governing bankruptcy should 
 
 45 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 187-89; see also Posner, supra note 1, at 121-22. 
 46 Posner, supra note 1, at 121. 
 47 Id. at 122. 
 48 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 1; see also White, supra note 1, at 685 (“The United States 
is extremely unusual among industrialized nations for its very pro-debtor bankruptcy 
laws.”); Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical 
and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 52 (1986) (“In the context of 
consumer bankruptcies, the Code is most notable for its significant expansion of the 
protection afforded to bankrupt debtors.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law As Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 393, 405 (2001) (“It is generally accepted that one of the factors driving the 
upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates in recent decades has been a general decline 
in the social stigma associated with filing bankruptcy.”). 
 50 As one commentator has observed: 
[T]he right to a discharge is not now, and never has been, absolute.  
The difficulty lies in determining what the parameters of the fresh start 
policy should be.  The question is of increasing importance as 
nonbusiness bankruptcy filings continue to skyrocket, exceeding half a 
million filings in each of the last two years. 
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and 
the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 57 (1990); see also Boshkoff, supra 
note 6, at 551 (“[N]ot every debtor receives a discharge.  The statute directs the 
court to deny a discharge to an individual debtor in a variety of situations.  Debtor 
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encourage socially beneficial outcomes while discouraging those that 
are socially undesirable.  As Professor Zywicki has observed, 
“bankruptcy is at least as much a moral and cultural issue as an 
economic issue.  The modern bankruptcy system mocks traditional 
values of thrift, personal responsibility, and maintaining promises.” 51  
Bankruptcy should not reward undesirable behavior or impose a 
burden on creditors where certain consequences were avoidable 
through reasonable actions on the part of the debtor.  Accordingly, 
rules should be developed that prevent such abuses. 
For example, where debtors are faced with insolvency as the 
result of circumstances that are truly not their fault, such as 
unexpected medical costs for which the debtor had no opportunity to 
insure, the case for allowing the debtor to take full advantage of the 
bankruptcy system to obtain a fresh start is much stronger.52  On the 
other hand, where consumer debtors seek merely to take advantage 
of the system and avoid debts that they are fully capable of paying, 
bankruptcy courts may adopt rules that prevent such socially 
undesirable conduct.  Indeed, certain commentators have observed 
that “the Bankruptcy Code, as currently drafted, contains a fairly 
sophisticated deployment of open-textured rules predicated on the 
idea of competent judges who are able to detect abuse.” 53  As the 
wave of consumer bankruptcies amply demonstrates, there is an 
urgent need for the courts to fully exercise their latitude to put in 
place rules that will stem the current abuses. 
In fact, courts in certain instances have already begun to employ 
the tools available to them under the Code to prevent such 
 
misconduct–typically some improper activity which is prejudicial to creditors holding 
present claims against the debtor–is an element of almost every case in which the 
discharge is withheld.”). 
 51 Zywicki, supra note 49, at 408; see also id. at 427 (“The current American 
bankruptcy system is . . . unique in the legal systems of the world—it provides 
powerful economic incentives to file bankruptcy and places few limitations on 
opportunistic use of bankruptcy.”); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, 
Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh 
Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 241 (1995) (“[T]here is something instinctively 
unsettling in abiding a debtor with significant unencumbered assets who 
purposefully converts those assets into exempt form, thereby placing them beyond 
the reach of creditors, and then seeks absolution from her unpaid debts by means of 
the bankruptcy discharge.”); cf. Warren, supra note 19, at 348 (“Strategic, and often 
wasteful, action is a persistent problem in collection systems.  Under any system, both 
debtors and creditors can be counted on to press whatever advantages they may 
have.”). 
 52 See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 242-43 (noting one study that found that “almost 
twenty percent of the debtors . . . listed medical complications as a reason for their 
bankruptcy filing”). 
 53 Janger, supra note 20, at 595. 
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undesirable results.  One of the mechanisms debtors often attempt to 
utilize to shield their assets from creditors is the conversion of assets 
that would be subject to division among creditors to assets that fall 
within one of the “exemptions” created by state law and recognized 
under the Bankruptcy Code.  A notorious example is the homestead 
exemption, which in certain states allows debtors to shield their 
homes from division among their creditors.54  By converting 
nonexempt assets to exempt assets, debtors who may otherwise be 
able to pay their creditors are allowed to forego payment. 
The Bankruptcy Code, however, contains mechanisms for 
preventing such abuse.  For example, under Section 523, specific 
debts that are incurred under false pretenses are not subject to 
discharge.55  Under this section, courts may uphold “objections to a 
debtor’s claim of exemption based on the last-minute conversion of 
non-exempt property to exempt form.”56  Courts, however, have gone 
even further, completely denying debtors any discharge of their debts 
under Section 727(a)(2) of the Code57 based on “pre-bankruptcy 
conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property” on the 
grounds that such conversion constituted “intentional concealment 
of assets.”58  Accordingly, under such precedents, “the use of 
nonexempt assets to create more exempt assets can itself be grounds 
for denial of discharge.”59 
 
 54 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 209. 
 55 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2002) (“A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 
1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of 
credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial 
condition.”). 
 56 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 51, at 281 (citing Hanson v. First National 
Bank, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988)) (footnote omitted). 
 57 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2002) (“The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, 
unless . . . the debtor, with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an 
officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, 
removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, 
removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed . . . property of the debtor, within one 
year before the date of the filing of the petition.”). 
 58 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 51, at 269 (citing In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 
(5th Cir. 1983); Northwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988); 
and In re Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1442 (1985) (“[B]ankruptcy 
discharge does seem like a natural starting place for lawmakers designing penalties 
for certain fraudulent activities.  The relation between the activities covered by 
section 727 and creditors’ collection efforts may be so close as to justify 
presumptively denying discharge to a debtor who engages in such activities — in 
addition to imposing whatever other penalties he might deserve.”). 
 59 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 51, at 278; see also id. at 293 (“[T]he 
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Other potential mechanisms exist that may be employed to 
prevent consumer bankruptcy abuse.  For example, courts have 
developed a doctrine under which a debtor’s bankruptcy petition 
may be dismissed if it is filed in “bad faith.”60  This doctrine arguably 
may be applied to ensure that consumer debtors who are capable of 
paying their debts and are merely filing for strategic purposes will not 
be allowed to use the bankruptcy system to escape their debts.  Thus, 
as the foregoing discussion makes clear, a number of tools exist for 
imposing rational constraints on the wave of consumer bankruptcies 
flooding the system. 
2.  Mass Torts 
A second area in which further judicial innovation may be 
desirable is in the context of corporate reorganization involving mass 
torts.  Here, there is a pressing need for bankruptcy courts to ensure 
that only deserving claims receive compensation.  Numerous 
commentators, for example, have recognized that the filing of 
thousands of dubious claims have plagued asbestos litigation.61  
 
conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt form on the eve of bankruptcy has come 
to be regarded as behavior at odds with the image of the honest but unfortunate 
debtor, a normative ideal widely held as a general matter if nowhere defined with 
rigorous particularity.”); Jackson, supra note 58, at 1443 (“[C]onsider whether a 
debtor should be denied discharge for converting his nonexempt assets to 
exemptions on the eve of bankruptcy in order to maximize his exemptions in an 
anticipated bankruptcy proceeding.  Despite a legislative statement suggesting that 
the Bankruptcy Code does not reach acts of this kind, courts frequently treat such 
intentional conversions as falling under the ban of section 727(a)(2).”). 
 60 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 51, at 296 (“[A] debtor may . . . be 
dismissed from the bankruptcy process for having filed in bad faith.  There is, as 
already observed, no statutory requirement that a debtor file in ‘good faith’; rather, 
the requirement has been introduced into doctrine through the case law.”) 
(footnote omitted); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 44, at 944 (noting “the 
widespread acceptance of a good faith filing prerequisite” but also observing that 
“the standards by which good faith is to be judged remain ill defined and obscure”). 
 61 See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an 
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1826-27 (1992) (“The more 
successful courts became in devising ways to more quickly and assuredly compensate 
the meritorious, the larger the number of unmeritorious claims that were able to 
enter the system.”); Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-
Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 384 (1993) (“Tens of thousands of 
[asbestos] claims have been made, many successfully, by individuals who are 
understandably worried about their exposure to asbestos but who are not now and 
never will be afflicted with disease.”); Debora R. Hensler, Fashioning a National 
Resolution of Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1967, 1974 (1992) (“Cases with minor injuries, or no current impairment at 
all, are producing payment for some individuals while other individuals, with serious 
impairment or fatal illness, are unable to obtain timely compensation.”); Victor E. 
Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation’s Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently observed that asbestos 
litigation is “a disaster of major proportions to both the victims and 
the producers of asbestos products” alike, with baseless claims 
receiving compensation at the expense of more deserving claimants.62  
As a result, “[m]ost commentators agree that tort litigation today is a 
highly unsatisfactory system for resolving claims arising out of 
workers’ exposure to asbestos.”63  By eliminating those claims that 
lack merit, bankruptcy courts can ensure that only deserving 
claimants receive compensation.64  Stringent judicial “gatekeeping” 
can be used to weed out “weak and frivolous claims.”65  The 
bankruptcy courts enjoy wide latitude to ensure that only deserving 
claimants receive compensation through their power to disallow 
 
is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
247, 250-51 (2000) (observing that “[t]he push toward efficiency has encouraged the 
filing of baseless claims on behalf of unimpaired claimants” and that, indeed, “[t]he 
bulk of the new claims are filed by people who have not been impaired by asbestos”); 
John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990, 1010 
(1995) (observing that there has been a “parasitic fusion of strong and weak cases”); 
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 521 
(1994) (“Some attorneys . . . will take almost any case without regard to its merit, 
hoping for a global settlement.”). 
 62 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
 63 Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1992); see generally REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2 (Mar. 1991) (describing 
asbestos litigation as a “disaster of major proportions to both the victims and the 
producers of asbestos products”). 
 64 Commentators have noted procedural problems and strategic behavior by the 
plaintiffs’ bar in the Manville reorganization that arguably led to a failure to impose 
such requirements, resulting in depletion of the assets available to pay valid claims.  
See NBRC REPORT, supra note 35, at 344 (“[T]he Johns-Manville trust faced 
procedural problems that affected its adequacy.  Parties ‘jumped the queue’ and 
proceeded to litigation, while group settlements to avoid litigation multiplied, 
forcing the trust to litigate on several fronts at once, and not surprisingly, these 
problems undermined the trust’s ability to devote its resources to equitable 
compensation of asbestos claimants.”); Frank Macchiarola, The Manville Personal 
Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 583, 602-03 (1996) 
(“The Trust mechanism was poorly designed and highly vulnerable to litigation . . . .  
The Trust did little to effectively apportion its funding among all possible claimants 
because their settlements were docket driven.”). 
 65 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 n.24 (5th Cir. 1996).  As 
Judge Jones recently observed: 
For nearly two decades, as waves of product liability litigation have 
assaulted civil courts, the same questions have continued to arise and 
yet defy solution.  Even the question of the defendants’ liability, which 
should be a critical matter in the fashioning of a just solution, becomes 
submerged beneath the overwhelming volume of claims and the huge 
transactional costs of defending them.  In mass litigation, it is difficult 
to distinguish valid claims from frivolous or false ones. 
Jones, supra note 1, at 1696-97. 
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invalid claims, and in fact courts have used these powers to disallow 
invalid tort claims.66  Such procedures are consistent with the 
“policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code”67 and preserve debtor assets to ensure an equitable 
distribution. 
As these examples show, as in the past, the courts can make a 
valuable contribution in solving problems currently facing the 
bankruptcy system.  While legislative solutions to such problems may 
be desirable, they may not always be feasible given the prevailing 
political climate.  Moreover, in many instances Congress seems to 
have waited for the courts to address a problem before acting, merely 
codifying procedures that have already been put in place.  
Irrespective of whether the legislature chooses to act, however, 
judicial problem-solving can function as a valuable tool for correcting 
many of the problems currently plaguing our bankruptcy system. 
CONCLUSION 
Debt’s Dominion makes a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the forces influencing the nation’s bankruptcy laws 
over the last two hundred years.  While Professor Skeel focuses on the 
evolution of legislation governing the bankruptcy system in the 
United States, the courts have had a significant role in shaping the 
bankruptcy framework.  That role has manifested itself in two ways.  
First, and most obviously, the courts have established innovative 
mechanisms for addressing novel problems arising in bankruptcy.  
Where there has been an urgent need to address new problems that 
have arisen as the result of an ever-changing commercial landscape, 
courts have not failed to act.  Second, as is clear from Professor 
Skeel’s discussion of the historical evolution of our nation’s 
bankruptcy laws, the innovative mechanisms adopted by the courts 
 
 66 See, e.g., In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-0558, 2000 WL 422372, at *4 
(E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2000) (withdrawing the reference to determine “the validity of 
claims based on unreliable scientific evidence of disease and/or causation”); In re 
Dow Corning Corp., 215 B.R. 526, 529 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (applying Daubert 
standards in determining the validity of breast implant tort claims); In re Dow 
Corning Corp., 215 B.R. 346, 360 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Summary judgment 
will serve to weed out those claims which do not present a genuine issue of material 
fact, and for which the debtor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); In re 
Standard Insulations, Inc., 138 B.R. 947, 954 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (“Summary 
judgment is similar to the claims allowance process in that one purpose is to isolate 
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”); Toll, supra note 37, at 369 (“Dow 
Corning contests its liability for silicone-related claims and is using bankruptcy as a 
massive class action-type device to litigate its liability issues in a single forum.”). 
 67 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984). 
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often have formed the basis for substantive legislative changes.  Thus, 
in a very real sense, the courts have had a significant role in shaping 
the system that exists today.  This role becomes even more critical 
during periods of rapid change in the commercial landscape, which 
are often accompanied by unique problems calling for an immediate 
response, or during periods in which opposing political forces block 
meaningful legislative reform, leaving pressing needs unaddressed. 
